The paper considers separately the welfare of the source and destination countries as also the migrant.  It also makes a distinction between temporary and permanent migration on the one hand and skilled and unskilled migration on the other.  It argues that skilled emigration is likely to be potentially damaging to the small developing countries such as Jamaica that stand to lose a significant proportion of their skilled labor force to it but will on balance be beneficial to the large developing countries such as India and China.  The paper also questions the wisdom of the recent suggestions of a development strategy that relies primarily on temporary migration.

I point out several flaws in the recent study by Robin Burgess and Rohini Pande (AER2005) linking the bank branch expansion to poverty reduction in India during 1977-90.  The authors miss some critical details of the policy and, more importantly, fail to recognize that it was the credit policy and anti-poverty programs that drove the branch expansion rather than the adoption of a specific branch expansion rule.  These facts greatly undermines the identification strategy of the authors while giving rise to the omitted variables problem.

The empirical literature on anti-dumping shows that ceteris paribus the probability of a positive finding in injury investigations  is higher when defendants are many and small than when they are few and large.  Stated precisely, holding the market share of defendant firms constant, “cumulation,” defined as the practice of aggregating over the exports of several countries, has a positive effect on the probability of an affirmative injury determination.  In this paper, we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding.  We show that the presence of many small exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem that accompanies multiple defendants.  Unlike the dumping margin, which must be determined separately for each defendant firm, the injury determination is common to all defendant firms: either all defendants are found guilty of causing injury to the domestic firm or all are acquitted. To the extent that defense may be costly, this fact inevitably gives rise to a free-rider problem.